The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Essays in Law & Economics

SKU:10059572-0001

Wouter P.J. Wils

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Product Line	Kluwer Law International
Product SKU	10059572-0001
ISBN-13	9789041117571
Availability	Ships in 3-5 Business Days
Last Updated	2002-02-01

Overview

The enforcement of the EC antitrust rules is currently the subject of much discussion. The existing system for the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has been widely criticised as inadequate. Several changes have been introduced recently, and further reforms have been proposed, but the search for a coherent and effective enforcement regime remains unfinished.

Combining an in-depth examination of the law with a systematic economic analysis, Wouter Wils provides clear and illuminating answers to the major questions concerning the modernisation of EC antitrust enforcement:

Should a notification system be maintained, or should the antitrust rules be enforced exclusively through deterrence?
What are the respective roles of the European Commission, the national competition authorities and the national courts?
At what level should fines be set?
And is there a need to criminalise EC antitrust law by introducing individual penalties, in particular imprisonment?
Practitioners, officials and academics will find in this timely book a wealth of information on the existing enforcement practice and on the pending proposals for reform, as well as a rigorous intellectual framework that will structure and clarify current and future debate on the modernisation of EC antitrust enforcement.

Acknowledgements 1. Introduction 1.1. Subject Matter 1.2. Method 2. EC Competition Fines: To Deter or not to Deter 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Fines versus other Methods of Law Enforcement
2.3. The Correct Basis for Assessing Fines 2.4. The Practice of EC Competition Fines (1969-1994) 2.5. Do current Fines Deter? 2.6. To Deter or not to Deter 3. The Commission Notice on The Non-Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases 3.1. Summary of the Commission Notice 3.2. Precedents in The EC and in the US 3.3. Leniency and the Economics of Law Enforcement 3.4. The Conditions for Leniency Revisited 3.5. Legal Basis, Compatibility with General Principles and Binding Effect 3.6. Has the Cartel Enforcement Problem now been solved? 4. The Commission’s New Method for Calculating Fines in Antitrust Cases 4.1. Summary of the Commission Notice 4.2. The new Method Compared to Existing Law and Previous Practice 4.3. The Issue of Transparency 4.4. Some Further Characteristics of the new Method 4.5. Conclusion 5. Notification, Clearance and Exemption in EC Competition Law 5.1. Introduction 5.2. The Economics of Prescreening 5.3. Application to EC Competition Law Enforcement 6. The Commission’s Proposal for a new Council Regulation Replacing Regulation no 17 6.1. Introduction 6.2. The Timing of Legal Intervention: Ex Ante Enforcement Through Prescreening or Ex Post Enforcement Through Deterrence? 6.3. The Respective Roles of The Commission and the Competition Authorities of The Member States 6.4. The Role of Private Complainants and National Courts 6.5. Sanctions 6.6. Conclusion 7. The Undertaking as Subject of EC Competition Law and The Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons 7.1. The Undertaking as Subject of EC Competition Law 7.2. The Imputation of Infringements to natural or Legal Persons 8. Does the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Require not only fines on Undertakings but also Individual Penalties, in particular imprisonment? 8.1. Introduction 8.2. Who Commits Antitrust Violations, Why do they do it, and how can their Behavior be influenced? 8.3. The Case for Corporate Sanctions 8.4. The Case against Exclusive Reliance on Corporate Sanctions 8.5. The Case for Combining Corporate Sanctions with individual Penalties 8.6. The Case for Imprisonment 8.7. Some Further Issues 9. Conclusion 9.1. The Timing of Legal Intervention: Ex Ante Enforcement through prescreening or Ex Post Enforcement through Deterrence? 9.2. The Role of Different Enforcement Agents: The Commission, The Competition Authorities of The Member States, Private Com

The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Essays in Law & Economics

Overview

Table Of Contents

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