

Product Line | Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S. |
|---|---|
ISBN-13 | 9781543884784 |
Availability | Ships in 3-5 Business Days |
Publish Frequency | Periodically |
Last Updated | 2026-06-29 |
This treatise’s predecessor – The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors – first appeared in 1987. Over the years, The Business Judgment Rule grew into a four volume sixth edition published in 2009. The Business Judgment Rule has been cited in over 100 court decisions, including 17 decisions in the Delaware Supreme Court, 36 decisions in the Delaware Court of Chancery, and decisions in courts in Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
This successor treatise – The Business Judgment Rule In Stockholder Derivative Litigation – takes a deep dive into this new titular subject as of the end of 2025. Developments in the law stating and refining the parameters of the business judgment rule in stockholder derivative litigation during the decade and a half since the sixth edition of The Business Judgment Rule was published in 2009 cannot be overstated.
Chapter I, The Role Of Delaware Law In Corporate Governance, discusses the predominance of Delaware law in corporate governance counseling and litigation. That said, this treatise also highlights important differences distinguishing the law governing derivative litigation in Delaware and in other states.
Chapter II, The Business Judgment Rule: A Primer – And Competing Standards Of Judicial Review, summarizes the nuts and bolts principles underlying the business judgment rule – and competing enhanced scrutiny and entire fairness standards of review, now with the benefit of more than 1,000 new decisions since The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors was published. Chapter II focuses special attention on the impact on these legal principles of Senate Bill 21, enacted in 2025, amending Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Chapter II also focuses on recent decisions exploring the business judgment rule’s application to corporate officers who are not directors and corporate officers acting outside their role as directors – a hotly debated subject in academic circles concerning which there is little case law.
Chapter III, The Nature Of Stockholder Derivative Litigation, discusses the differences dividing traditional litigation and stockholder derivative litigation.
Chapter IV, The Demand Requirement In Derivative Litigation: Demand Excused, Demand Refused, And Universal Demand, discusses the most frequently litigated issue in derivative litigation: pre-suit demand.
Chapter IV A, Two Paths To Standing: Demand Excused And Demand Refused – Except In Universal Demand States, discusses the two paths stockholder plaintiffs historically have taken to gain standing to sue derivatively: (1) alleging that demand is excused because a demand would be futile, and (2) alleging that a demand has been made and wrongfully refused.
Chapter IV B, Basic Principles Underlying Demand, discusses the substantive nature of the demand requirement, procedural rules such as Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 that implement the substantive demand requirement, stockholder communications that do and do not constitute demands, the board’s duties after receiving a demand, heightened pleading requirements mandating pleading with particularity in actions alleging that demand is excused or has been wrongfully refused, and choice of law issues. Chapter IV B also discusses the unavailability of discovery to stockholders seeking to allege that demand is futile and excused or has been wrongfully refused, but the availability of books and records inspections for this purpose – albeit within new limits established by Senate Bill 21 in Delaware in 2025.
Chapter IV C, Demand Excused: Futility, discusses demand futility, most importantly Delaware’s new test for assessing demand futility announced in 2021 in United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg. Chapter IV C devotes special attention to Zuckerberg’s synthesis of Zuckerberg’s predecessor tests, Aronson v. Lewis and Rales v. Blasband, and the continued vitality of caselaw under Aronson and Rales following Zuckerberg.
Chapter IV C devotes special attention to the independence issues – typically arising out of family, personal, business, and philanthropic relationships – that have dominated demand futility analyses in recent years, and to other states’ approaches to demand futility, including New York, California, Maryland, Minnesota, Indiana, and Alaska, some of which track and some of which differ from Delaware.
Chapter IV C discusses the time at which futility is measured, the impact of changes in board composition following the commencement of litigation, and the stage of litigation at which demand futility may be decided – and new case law exploring how many “bites at the apple” boards may have opposing allegations that demand is futile on successive motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and at trial.
Chapter IV C – and, later, Chapter IV D – discusses the rule in Delaware under Spiegel v. Buntrock that, “[b]y electing to make a demand, a shareholder plaintiff tacitly concedes the independence of a majority of the board to respond” – a rule not followed in a substantial number of states – and the extent to which delegation of a demand to a board committee waives a claim that demand is required.
Chapter IV C discusses a new body of law governing the preclusive effect of decisions granting motions to dismiss actions alleging that demand is excused, most notably the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police Retirement System and California State Teachers’ Retirement System v. Alvarez finding that judgments in California and Arkansas courts requiring demands under Delaware law precluded litigation concerning demand futility in Delaware.
Chapter IV C discusses the standard of review on appeal following a ruling that demand is or is not futile – historically abuse of discretion, but, the Fifth Circuit noted in 2025 in Ezell v. Dinges, a “chorus of authority” now holds that a decision to dismiss a derivative action for failure to plead demand futility is to be reviewed de novo.
Chapter IV D, Demand Refused, discusses the business judgment rule’s almost universal application in cases where demands are made and refused – and recent decisions applying these principles and the Spiegel v. Buntrock doctrine noted above.
Chapter IV E, Universal Demand States, discusses the universal demand requirement in 24 states that have rejected Delaware law and require demands in all cases, all by statute, most tracking the Model Business Corporation Act – Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, plus the District of Columbia. Chapter IV E discusses the rules that govern board and board committee decisions refusing demands under the Model Business Corporation Act and in the 24 states listed above requiring demands in all cases. Chapter IV E contrasts the universal demand requirement in the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance – soon to be replaced by the Restatement of Corporate Governance – and the American Law Institute’s approach to board and board committee decisions to refuse demands. The American Law Institute’s approach differs substantially from the Model Business Corporation Act and states following the Model Business Corporation Act.
Chapter V, Termination Of Derivative Litigation By Special Litigation Committee, discusses termination of derivative litigation by a special litigation committee or “SLC” consisting of independent and disinterested board members who investigate and decide what action should be taken to address the litigation when a majority of the corporation’s directors cannot impartially consider a demand. Chapter V highlights substantial new case law developing Delaware’s Zapata v. Maldonado Corp. standard of review in SLC cases, allowing the court to exercise its own independent business judgment with respect to the merits of an SLC decision to terminate or settle derivative litigation. Chapter V also highlights substantial statutory and case law outside Delaware rejecting Zapata and precluding judicial review of the merits of an SLC’s decision.
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About The Author
Acknowledgments
Foreword By E. Norman Veasey
Introduction
Chapter I. The Role Of Delaware In Corporate Governance
A. Most Corporations Are Incorporated In Delaware
B. The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Delaware Law Governs Delaware Corporations, In Litigation In And Out Of Delaware
C. Courts Applying The Corporate Law Of States Other Than Delaware Look To Delaware Law For Guidance
Chapter II. The Business Judgment Rule: A Primer—And Competing Standards Of Judicial Review
A. The Fiduciary Duties Of Care And Loyalty
1. The Duty Of Care—Gross Negligence Standard Of Liability And Section 102(b)(7) Exculpation
2. The Duty Of Loyalty—Disinterestedness, Independence, And Good Faith
B. The Business Judgment Rule Presumption
1. The Presumption Reaches Both The Duty Of Care And The Duty Of Loyalty
2. 2025: Section 144’s New And Heightened Presumption
3. The Presumption Reaches Only Business Decisions Within The Scope of Board’s Authority Not Tainted By Fraud, Illegality, Or Ultra Vires Conduct
C. The Presumption’s Effect When Not Rebutted—Or When Irrebuttable
D. Rebutting The Presumption By Alleging A Breach Of The Duty Of Care Or The Duty Of Loyalty
1. The Usual Case: Board Decisions Not Approved By Stockholders
a. Duty Of Care Allegations
b. Duty Of Loyalty Allegations
c. The Presumption Must Be Rebutted With Respect To A Majority Of The Board
d. Evenly Divided Boards
e. Exceptions
(i) Plaintiff Overcomes Presumption With Respect To Majority Of Board, But Not Majority Of Decision-Making Directors
(ii) Plaintiff Fails To Overcome Presumption With Respect To Majority Of The Board, But Majority Is Tainted By Conflicted Fiduciary’s Failure To Disclose Or Board’s Failure To Oversee Conflicted Fiduciary
(ii-1) Conflicted Fiduciary Fails To Disclose Interest: Fraud On The Board
(ii-2) Board Failure To Oversee Conflicted Fiduciary
2. Board Decisions Approved By Stockholders—The Presumption Is Irrebuttable
E. Minority View: The Business Judgment Rule As An Affirmative Defense That Cannot Be Considered On Motion To Dismiss
F. Waste
G. The Entire Fairness Standard When The Presumption Is Rebutted
1. Weinberger: Fair Dealing And Fair Price
2. Exception: Disinterested Director Or Disinterested Stockholder Approval Shifts Burden Of Proof Where Entire Fairness Otherwise Would Apply—And Section 144’s Safe Harbor
3. Damage Considerations In Actions Involving Unfair Dealing But Fair Price
4. Additional Damage Considerations In Entire Fairness Cases—And The Availability Of Rescission And Rescissionary Damages
H. Business Judgment Review Versus Entire Fairness
I. Intermediate Enhanced Scrutiny
J. Director-By-Director, Not Collective, Review Of Director Conduct
K. Officers
Chapter III. The Nature Of Stockholder Derivative Litigation
A. Claim Belongs To Corporation, Not Stockholder Plaintiff
B. Bankruptcy And Insolvency Considerations
C. Double Derivative Actions
Chapter IV. The Demand Requirement In Derivative Litigation: Demand Excused, Demand Refused, And Universal Demand
A. Two Paths To Standing: Demand Excused And Demand Refused—Except In Universal Demand States
B. Basic Principles Underlying Demand
1. Definition Of Demand
2. A Substantive Rule Of Law, Implemented Procedurally By Rule 23.1
3. Rationale
a. Directors, Not Stockholders, Manage Corporations—Including Litigation
b. Benefits Of Intracorporate Dispute Resolution
c. Safeguard Against Strike Suits
4. Litigation—Even Of Claims Having Merit—Not Always In Best Interests Of Corporation
5. Board’s Duties After Receiving A Demand
6. Board Entitled To Adequate Time To Respond To Demand
7. Heightened Pleading Requirements
8. No Discovery Permitted
9. Pre-Suit Books And Records Demands Permitted And Encouraged—But Within 2025 Statutory Limits
10. Choice Of Law Principles
a. State Law Governs
b. Federal Policy Exception
11. Examples Of Stockholder Communications That Have And Have Not Been Held To Be Demands
12. Third-Party Standing To Raise Demand As A Defense
13. Demand In Section 16(b) Cases
C. Demand Excused: Futility
1. The Meaning Of Futility
2. The Time At Which Demand Futility Is Measured
a. The Time The Complaint Is Filed
b. Not The Time Of The Alleged Wrongdoing
c. Post-Complaint Events Not Relevant
3. Changes In Board Composition Following Commencement Of Litigation
a. Claims “Validly in Litigation”
b. Claims Not “Validly in Litigation”
c. The Second Circuit’s Approach: Brody
4. The Stage At Which Demand Futility May Be Decided
5. Futility In Delaware
a. Overview: Aronson, Rales, And Zuckerberg
b. Aronson
c. Rales
d. From Aronson And Rales To Zuckerberg
e. Zuckerberg
f. Zuckerberg Prongs (i) And (iii): Disinterestedness And Independence
g. Additional Independence Considerations In Demand—And Other—Cases Involving Family, Personal, Business, And Philanthropic Relationships
(i) Family Relationships
(ii) Personal And Business Relationships
(ii-1) Mere Personal Or Business Relationships Not Enough
(ii-2) But Some Personal Or Business Relationships Are Enough
(ii-3) Past Relationships
(ii-4) Delaware Supreme Court Case Studies: Sanchez, Sandys, Marchand, And Match
(ii-5) Additional Case Studies
(iii) Philanthropic Relationships
(iv) Minority View: Structural Bias
h. Zuckerberg Prong (ii): Substantial Likelihood Of Liability—And The Effect Of Section 102(b)(7) Exculpatory Provisions
i. Commonly Rejected Demand Futility Allegations
6. Other States’ Approaches To Futility
a. New York
(i) Barr, Marx, And Bansbach
(ii) Decisions Requiring Demand
(iii) Decisions Excusing Demand
b. California
c. Maryland
d. Minnesota
e. Indiana
f. Alaska
7. Waiver Considerations With Respect To Disinterestedness, Independence, And Futility
a. Making A Demand
b. Delegating Decision-Making Authority To Board Committee
8. Preclusion
a. The Majority—And Near Unanimous—Rule: Demand Dismissal Binding In Subsequent Action
b. Limits On Preclusion In Actions Involving Different Claims
c. The Debate In Delaware
(i) Early Delaware Decisions: West Coast, Career
Education, And Norfolk County
(ii) Pyott
(iii) EZCORP
(iv) California State
(v) Fox
9. Standard Of Review On Appeal
D. Demand Refused
1. The Supreme Court’s Pre-Erie Federal Common Law Decisions
2. Delaware’s Business Judgment Rule Standard
3. Delaware’s Motion to Dismiss Standard
4. The Tacit Concession Of Disinterestedness And Independence
5. The Issues Remaining Following The Tacit Concession Of Disinterestedness And Independence: Due Care And Good Faith
6. No Prescribed Procedure That Board Must Follow
7. Delaware Supreme Court Decisions Dismissing Wrongful Refusal Claims
8. Additional Delaware Decisions Dismissing Wrongful Refusal Claims
9. Decisions Denying Motions To Dismiss Wrongful Refusal Claims
10. Demands Where Related Litigation Is Pending—And Tolling Agreements
a. Refusals Of Demands Based On Related Pending Litigation
b. Deferrals Of Demands Based On Related Pending Litigation
11. Considerations Involving Counsel: Stepak
12. New York Law
a. Auerbach In The Demand Refused Context
b. Differences Between New York And Delaware Law
(i) Particularized Pleading Not Required In New York
(ii) No Tacit Concession Of Disinterestedness And Independence In New York
c. New York Case Studies
E. Universal Demand States
1. The Model Business Corporation Act And Principles Of Corporate Governance Universal Demand Requirements
2. The United States Supreme Court’s Decision In Kamen
3. State Statutes Adopting Universal Demand Requirements
4. Wrongful Refusal Of Demand Claims Under The Model Business Corporation Act
5. Wrongful Refusal Of Demand Claims Under Statutes Adopting The Model Business Corporation Act
6. Wrongful Refusal Of Demand Claims Under Principles Of Corporate Governance
a. Section 7.04 Motions
b. Section 7.07 Through Section 7.13 Motions
7. Pennsylvania’s Statute
F. Demand On Stockholders
Chapter V. Termination Of Derivative Litigation By Special Litigation Committees
A. Restoration Of Board Control If Stockholder Satisfies Demand Requirement
B. Power To Terminate
1. Gall, Auerbach, And Zapata
2. Miller And Alford
C. Scope Of Judicial Review—Auerbach Versus Zapata
1. New York’s Auerbach Approach
a. Auerbach
b. Auerbach Outside New York
2. Delaware’s Zapata Approach
a. Zapata’s Two-Step Test
b. Step 1: Independence, Good Faith, Reasonableness, With Burden Of Proof On Corporation
(i) Independence
(ii) Good Faith And Reasonableness
c. Step 2: In The Court’s Discretion, The Court’s Own Independent Business Judgment
d. The Zapata Motion: Limited Issues, Limited Discovery, Atypical Hybrid Summary Judgment Standard
e. Zapata Outside Delaware
3. Model And Statutory Provisions
4. Zapata Case Studies
a. The Supreme Court’s Decisions In Kaplan, Kahn, And Diep
b. Court Of Chancery Decisions
c. Oracle: Discovery Of SLC Where SLC Returns Control Of Claim To Stockholder

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