
Product Line | Kluwer Law International |
|---|---|
ISBN-13 | 9789403527598 |
Availability | Ships in 5-7 Business Days |
Last Updated | 2025-09-19 |
International Competition Law Series#92
Big Tech Acquisitions and Merger Control is a book elucidating the phenomenon which is now often referred to as ‘killer acquisitions’ and which raises problems with regard to both the jurisdictional and the substantive aspects of merger control. Albeit legal analysis of (merger-related) firm dominance in ‘Big Tech’ has emphasised the so-called GAFAM – Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft – this important book stresses the necessity for a much broader view. Several large tech platforms continue to seek dominance in and across various market segments by acquiring small start-up companies with high competitive potential but yet little or no turnover, thereby running the risk of escaping antitrust scrutiny.
What’s in this book:
Drawing on legislative initiatives and enforcement practice, especially in the European Union and the United Kingdom, and through an in-depth analysis of the most prominent decisions concerning Big Tech acquisitions, the author spells out the nature of the following relevant legal issues and strategies:
Policy proposals and the academic legal literature are accounted for, with due regard to economic considerations as well.
How this will help you:
As competition authorities and legislators around the globe struggle to find a befitting response to the expansion and consolidation of dominance in various digital markets, it becomes imperative to contemplate alternatives to the current turnover-based notification thresholds and to rethink the substantive assessment of Big Tech acquisitions. This book, with its thorough guidance on the characteristics, challenges, and treatment of digital platforms and ecosystems in the context of merger control – and its clear exposition of applicable theories of harm – will significantly aid practitioners, competition authorities, and policymakers in effectively navigating the challenging tasks of establishing jurisdiction, defining relevant markets, and assessing market power and competitive harm.
Glossary and Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
PART I
Introduction
CHAPTER 1
Relevance: Has Big Tech’s ‘Shopping Spree’ Turned into a ‘Killing Spree’?
CHAPTER 2
Methodology and Structure
CHAPTER 3
Economic Principles of Platform and Ecosystem Competition
PART II
Jurisdictional Rules: Different Approaches to Capturing Big Tech Acquisitions
CHAPTER 4
Exploring the Existence of an Enforcement Gap
CHAPTER 5
Share-Based Thresholds
CHAPTER 6
Value-Based Thresholds
CHAPTER 7
Ex Post Merger Control
CHAPTER 8
Preliminary Conclusion on Jurisdictional Rules
PART III
Substantive Aspects: Assessing Big Tech Acquisitions
CHAPTER 9
Market Definition and Market Power
CHAPTER 10
Theories of Harm
CHAPTER 11
Policy Proposals
CHAPTER 12
Preliminary Conclusion on Substantive Aspects
PART IV
New Paths: The European Commission’s Approach to Capturing Big Tech Acquisitions
CHAPTER 13
‘Hiding in Plain Sight’: Strengthening the Referral Mechanism
CHAPTER 14
A (Half-Baked) Notification Obligation for Designated Firms
CHAPTER 15
The DMA and Its Interplay with Article 22 EUMR: A Hotchpotch
PART V
Conclusion
CHAPTER 16
Key Findings
CHAPTER 17
Outlook
Bibliography
Index
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