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Handbook of Section 1983 Litigation

Handbook of Section 1983 Litigation

SKU:10086717-7777
David W. Lee
Format
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Price:
$6,995.00
Product Line
Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S.
Product SKU
10086717-7777
ISBN-13
9781543832020
Availability
Ships in 3-5 Business Days
Publish Frequency
Semi-annually
Last Updated
2026-04-17

Overview

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to provide redress for violations of federally protected rights committed by persons acting under color of law. In the last few decades, there has been unprecedented growth in the volume and type of cases filed under § 1983, which has generated a comprehensive, intricate, and complex body of law. Handbook of Section 1983 Litigation provides quick and concise answers to issues that frequently arise in § 1983 cases, from police misconduct to affirmative action to gender and race discrimination.


The 2023-1 Supplement includes many recent developments in the area of § 1983, and adds significant new and revised material, including the following:


  • In Garnier v. O’Connor-Ratcliff, the Ninth Circuit found that members of a school district’s board of trustees acted under color of state law by using their social media pages as public forums in carrying out their official duties. The Ninth Circuit stated that this case was an issue of first impression in the Circuit: whether a state official violates the First Amendment by creating a publicly accessible social media page related to his or her official duties and then blocking certain members of the public from that page because of the nature of their comments. Applying First Amendment public forum criteria, the court determined that restrictions on certain individuals were not appropriately tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. (See §§ 1.04[A] and 6.06[B].)


  • The Seventh Circuit issued a decision in Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, rejecting a claim that a “gap” in a city policy constituted municipal action to establish city liability for police officer off-duty activities. The Seventh Circuit found that it was not obvious that the city policy prohibiting police action while under the influence subject to a narrow and specific exception would lead off-duty officers to use excessive force in violation of the Constitution. (See §§ 3.01[A] and 3.02[C].)


  • In Villarreal v. City of Laredo, Texas, Villarreal brought a § 1983 suit against various police officers, county prosecutors, the county itself, and the City of Laredo, and the lower court dismissed all the claims (based on the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments). The Fifth Circuit determined that the lower court erred in awarding immunity to the arresting officers. The defendants arrested and attempted to prosecute Villarreal for asking questions of public officials, a clear violation of the First Amendment. An official who commits a patently “obvious” violation of the Constitution is not entitled to qualified immunity. (See §§ 6.09[D] and 7.03[A][2].)


  • In Richmond v. Badia, the question on appeal was whether a school resource officer was entitled to qualified immunity for throwing a seventh grader to the floor of a middle school lobby. The student argued that, even if the officer had arguable probable cause to seize him, the officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed. The officer had no law enforcement justification for grabbing the student’s face, slamming him to the ground, or twisting his arm. The potential crime at issue was at most a misdemeanor battery, and the student did not pose a threat and he did not attempt to flee the school lobby. The student also did not refuse to obey any lawful commands. (See § 7.03[C][6][a].)


  • In Estate of Taylor v. Salt Lake City, the Tenth Circuit ruled that in evaluating the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force, the fact that it turned out that the suspect did not in fact have a weapon was irrelevant. The pertinent issue is the reasonableness of the shooting officer’s perspective. (See § 7.03[C][6][b].)


  • A Third Circuit decision, Garrett v. Murphy, held that dismissals under the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey are for failure to state a claim and are strikes for the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in forma pauperis (IFP) three-strikes rule. (See §§ 4.01[B] and 8.02.)


  • In Brown v. Sage, the Third Circuit held that the PLRA IFP provisions do not require the district courts to follow a rigid process in determining whether to allow the plaintiff to proceed IFP. The PLRA gives federal courts “discretion to consider the merits of a case and evaluate an IFP application in either order or even simultaneously.” The court ruled that an action is “brought” within the meaning of the PLRA when the prisoner submits his complaint to the court, not when the court ultimately authorizes the action. (See § 4.01[B].)


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Experts

  • David W. Lee
    David W. Lee
    Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis
    Of Counsel
    David W. Lee is of Counsel with the law firm Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis in Oklahoma City. David served as Chief of the Criminal and Federal
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Handbook of Section 1983 Litigation | Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory